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Abstract Various people have claimed that some cases involve indeterminate
permissibility. However, it’s unclear what guidance one can take away from this
fact: are indeterminately permissible options choiceworthy and if so when? In this
paper, I present a counterexample that undermines two existing responses to this
question and I then present two alternative solutions that avoid this counterexample.
Keywords Indeterminacy  Decision making  Choiceworthiness
In recent years a number of people have argued that permissibility can sometimes be
indeterminate. In the domain of morality, this view has been defended by
Schoenfield (2015) and Dougherty (2014), among others. In the domain of
rationality, by Rinard (2015) and Williams (2014).
To take just one example, Dougherty (2014) notes that it is morally permissible
to save a friend rather than a small number of strangers but morally impermissible to
save a friend rather than very many strangers. Given this, Dougherty thinks that
there will be some number of strangers such that it will be indeterminately
permissible to save a friend rather than this number of strangers.
Still, while such arguments have a certain plausibility, a challenge arises for
views on which permissibility can sometimes be indeterminate: how can a
judgement of indeterminate permissibility guide our choices?1 This challenge arises
& Adam Bales
atb39@cam.ac.uk
1 Trinity College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 1TQ, United Kingdom
1 The discussion to follow will have close parallels with discussions in the literature on decision making
given incomplete preferences (cf. Bradley 2015).
123
Philos Stud
DOI 10.1007/s11098-017-0930-5
because it’s unclear when and whether an indeterminately permissible option is
choiceworthy. In this paper, I will argue that two prominent solutions to this
challenge (from Williams 2014; Rinard 2015) both fail. I will then develop, and
weigh, two alternative solutions.
1 Two solutions
One solution, seemingly implicit in Rinard (2015), is the following:
CONSERVATIVE: An option is choiceworthy if it is determinately permissible and
is non-choiceworthy if it is determinately impermissible. There is no fact of
the matter as to whether an indeterminately permissible option is
choiceworthy.
CONSERVATIVE might be motivated by the thought that there is an analytic
connection between permissibility and choiceworthiness: to be choiceworthy just is
to be permissible; to be non-choiceworthy just is to be impermissible. Consequently,
in cases where permissibility is indeterminate, so too is choiceworthiness.
An alternative solution, due to Williams (2014, pp. 25–27; 2016), is the
following:
LIBERAL: If any choices are determinately permissible then all and only the
determinately permissible choices are choiceworthy. If no choices are
determinately permissible then all and only the indeterminately permissible
choices are choiceworthy.
The first clause of LIBERAL might be justified by pointing to the seeming absurdity
of choosing an option that is merely indeterminately permissible when there is an
alternative option available that is outright permissible. Then the second clause of
LIBERAL might be motivated by the mirror of this reasoning. In particular, this clause
might be motivated by the seeming absurdity of choosing a determinately
impermissible option when there are indeterminately permissible options available.
Still, while this argument for the second clause of LIBERAL provides a justification
for why only the indeterminately permissible options are choiceworthy, it provides
no reason to think that all of the indeterminately permissible options must be
choiceworthy. Fortunately, Williams has presented an argument for this part of the
clause (in outlining this argument, and throughout this paper more broadly, I will
assume a supervaluationist view of indeterminacy). To get to this, we first need to
introduce some terminology. Consider a swatch of paint, such that it is
indeterminate whether this swatch is red. One way of spelling out what this claim
means is to say that there are multiple different ways of making the concept ‘‘red’’
precise, such that some of these ways of sharpening the concept label the swatch as
red and others label it as not red. Using this terminology, we can say that an option
is indeterminately permissible if it is permissible according to some sharpenings and
impermissible according to others.
Now turn back to LIBERAL. The second clause of LIBERAL might be motivated by
the fact that the options satisfying this criterion seem to be unopen to neutral
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criticism. That is, all of the options labelled as choiceworthy by LIBERAL will be
permissible according to at least one sharpening and so, it seems, such an option can
be criticised only if we first cast aside this sharpening and instead focus merely on
some other sharpenings. Consequently, it seems that satisfying LIBERAL would ensure
that no-one who selected only choiceworthy options could be criticised from a
neutral standpoint.
2 A counterexample
Both CONSERVATIVE and LIBERAL are compelling. However, a single case serves as a
counterexample to both of these principles. I will start out by outlining this case in
abstract terms. In this case, permissibility has two sharpenings and there are three
options: O1, O2 and O3. On the first sharpening the options are ranked as follows:
O1  O2  O3. On the second sharpening, they are ranked as follows:
O2 ¼ O3  O1.
Here O3 is not choiceworthy. After all, O3 is less good than O2 on one sharpening
and equally good on the other. As such, why choose O3 when you could choose O2
instead? This point can be made more precise. First, say that a option, O is
indeterminacy-dominated if there is some alternative option, A, such that A  O
according to all sharpenings and A  O according to at least one sharpening. An
indeterminacy-dominated option is not choiceworthy, for just the reason outlined
above: why make such a choice when you could choose the dominating alternative
instead? O3 is indeterminacy-dominated by O2 and so O3 is not choiceworthy.
This case undermines both CONSERVATIVE and LIBERAL. Take CONSERVATIVE first:
this principle entails that there is no fact of the matter about the choiceworthiness of
O3. After all, O3 is indeterminately permissible: it is permissible according to the
second sharpening but impermissible according to the first. In such circumstances,
CONSERVATIVE entails that there are no facts of the matter about the choiceworthiness
of the option. However, this judgement is false: O3 is non-choiceworthy.
Consequently, CONSERVATIVE is false.
Then take LIBERAL: this principle entails that O3 is choiceworthy. After all, no
option is determinately permissible in this case (as all options are suboptimal on at
least one sharpening). Consequently, LIBERAL labels all and only the indeterminately
permissible options as choiceworthy. Now we have just seen that O3 is
indeterminately permissible so it follows that LIBERAL entails the choiceworthiness
of this option. However, this too is false and so LIBERAL too is false.2 Consequently,
this case undermines both CONSERVATIVE and LIBERAL
2 Not only does this case serve as a counterexample to LIBERAL but it also undermines the justification for
adopting this principle in the first place. After all, this case makes clear that we can sometimes neutrally
criticise indeterminately permissible options: we can criticise them not from the perspective of certain
sharpenings but rather from a global perspective that looks at patterns of dominance across all of the
sharpenings.
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3 A concrete example
This same objection can also be started in more concrete terms. To do so, consider a
choice situation familiar from Williams (2014). Alice is to enter a cabinet. A person,
After-Alice, will leave the cabinet shortly after, such that it is an indeterminate
matter whether After-Alice is the same person as Alice. Now imagine that Alice has
three options. If she chooses Wealth, After-Alice will be paid $20,000; if she
chooses Pittance, After-Alice will be paid $1; if she chooses Generous, After-Alice
will watch as Alice’s brother Bob is given $100,000.
Now, imagine that Alice prefers that she herself has more money rather than less.
However, her feelings about Bob having money are more ambivalent: (a) if Alice is
watching then she values Bob getting money just as much as she values getting
money herself (because in such circumstances she feels a strong sense of familial
duty); but (b) Alice actually hates Bob and so as long as she doesn’t have to witness
the monetary transfer (and hence be made to feel familial duty) she would actually
prefer that he be impoverished. Finally, Alice cares not at all how much money
people other than herself and Bob have.
Here, there are two sharpenings: one on which After-Alice is Alice and one on
which she isn’t. On the first sharpening, Alice ranks the options as follows:
Generous  Wealth  Pittance. On the other hand, on the second sharpening, Alice
ranks the options as follows: Wealth ¼ Pittance  Generous.
It would be absurd for Alice to choose Pittance. After all, on the sharpening
where After-Alice is Alice this would be less desirable than choosing Wealth (it
would leave her with $1 rather than $20,000) and on the sharpening where After-
Alice is not Alice this option is no better than choosing Wealth (as Alice doesn’t
care how much money After-Alice receives on this sharpening). Consequently,
Pittance is not choiceworthy for Alice.
However, no option in this case is determinately permissible (as all options are
suboptimal on one sharpening) and all options are indeterminately permissible
(because all are optimal on one sharpening). So CONSERVATIVE will say that there is
no fact of the matter about the choiceworthiness of Pittance. And LIBERAL will
declare that this option is choiceworthy. Both of these claims are false and so this
case serves as a counterexample to both principles.
Consequently, if we are to accept that permissibility can sometimes be indeter-
minate, some other principle is needed to determine when options are choiceworthy.
4 Getting started
The discussion to this point gives us a necessary criterion for choiceworthiness: an
option is choiceworthy only if it is not indeterminacy dominated. Likewise, it gives
us a sufficient criterion for non-choiceworthiness: an option is non-choiceworthy if
it is indeterminacy dominated. LIBERAL had problematic implications in the above
case because it violated this necessary criterion; CONSERVATIVE had problems because
it violated the sufficient criterion. In the light of this, it is clear that in order to avoid
A. Bales
123
the above counterexample a principle of choiceworthiness must satisfy these
criteria.
Still, a whole range of principles will do so. Consequently, more will need to be
said if we’re to identify a full principle of choiceworthiness. In order to get to such a
principle, then, I start with a puzzle case. Once again, in this case there are two
sharpenings of rational permissibility and three available options, O4, O5, and O6.
Further, in this case: (a) on the first sharpening, O4  O5  O6; and (b) on the
second sharpening, O6  O5  O4.
Here’s the puzzle: will there be any cases with this form in which O5 is
choiceworthy? Here’s an argument that there won’t be: O5 is impermissible on all
sharpenings and so is determinately impermissible. Now it might be thought that the
link between determinate impermissibility and choiceworthiness is settled: deter-
minately impermissible options are non-choiceworthy. Consequently, we can
conclude, O5 is not choiceworthy.
On the other hand, here’s an argument that O5 will be choiceworthy given
some ways of filling in the further details of this scenario: O5 is the middle
option on both sharpenings, while O4 and O6 are each the least desirable option
on one sharpening (even if they’re also each the most desirable option on another
sharpening). Consequently, choosing O5 might seem to involve a legitimate form
of hedging: this option might be choiceworthy because it allows the agent to
avoid choosing an option that is maximally dispreferred according to any
sharpening.
Insofar as we have arguments to two contradictory conclusions, we now have a
puzzle. What more can be said here? Well the first position, according to which O5
is non-choiceworthy, is plausible if we take there to be a certain sort of analytic
connection between permissibility and choiceworthiness. In particular, we might
think that it is analytic that a determinately permissible option is choiceworthy and a
determinately impermissible option non-choiceworthy. We might then think that
this analytic connection fails to tell us what to think in cases of indeterminate
permissibility, because our language conventions were not designed to cope with
such cases.3 Given this view, analytic considerations settle the choiceworthiness of
determinately impermissible options and so we are pushed to accept the first
solution to the puzzle.
On the other hand the second position, according to which O5 will be
choiceworthy for some ways of filling in the details of the case, will look plausible
to those who think that choice given indeterminacy is analogous to choice given
uncertainty. After all, according to a familiar result in the uncertainty literature (cf.
Jackson 1991), it is sometime subjectively choiceworthy to hedge by choosing an
option that one knows is not objectively choiceworthy (rather than choosing one of
two risky options, each of which might be objectively choiceworthy or might be
extremely undesirable from the objective perspective). Consequently, insofar as
3 This point also provides a response to the analytic argument for CONSERVATIVE. In particular, it might be
suggested that this argument for CONSERVATIVE asks too much of our language conventions, in expecting
them to settle even cases of indeterminate permissibility.
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uncertainty and indeterminacy are analogous, hedging in the case of indeterminacy
will appear reasonable.
To my mind, both of these views have some intuitive force and I leave it to my
reader to choose between them. Here, my intention is to remain neutral between
these possibilities by developing two principles of choice, each of which will appeal
to one side of this debate.
5 A first principle
Let’s start with those who think that O5 will never be choiceworthy. For such a
person, the choiceworthiness of determinately permissible and determinately
impermissible options is settled and it is only indeterminately permissible options
that are open to debate. In the light of this, here’s a plausible principle:
MODEST: (1) Determinately permissible options are choiceworthy; (2) Deter-
minately impermissible options are non-choiceworthy; and (3) Indetermi-
nately permissible options are choiceworthy if and only if they are not
indeterminacy dominated.
An immediate benefit of MODEST is that it resolves the counterexample case:
MODEST will not label O3 as choiceworthy, because O3 is indeterminacy dominated
by O2. Further, it is clear that MODEST will never label a determinately impermissible
option as choiceworthy, so for those who think that O5 is inevitably impermissible
this principle delivers the desired result.
On top of these points, MODEST has a number of further virtues. To pick just one:
if any determinately permissible options are available, then MODEST labels all and
only these options as choiceworthy. To see this, note that it follows immediately
from (1) that all of these options will be labelled as choiceworthy. Then (3) entails
that only these options will be labelled as choiceworthy. After all, any determinately
permissible option, D, will indeterminacy dominate any indeterminately permissible
option, I: D will be optimal on all sharpenings and so will be as desirable as I on the
sharpenings where I is permissible too but will be better than I on those sharpenings
where I is not permissible. Consequently, D will indeterminacy dominate I and so,
by (3), I will not be choiceworthy. So if there are any determinately permissible
options available then no indeterminately permissible options will be labelled as
choiceworthy. Combining this result with (2), which entails that no determinately
impermissible options are choiceworthy, it follows that if there are determinately
permissible options then only these options will be labelled as choiceworthy. So
MODEST can make sense of how determinate permissibility and indeterminate
permissibility intuitively interact.
In the light of all of this, for those who resolve the puzzling case by dismissing
O5 as a choiceworthy option MODEST is a promising principle of choiceworthiness.
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6 A second principle
What should we say if we accept that O5 will sometimes be choiceworthy? If this is
the case then the following is an initially-promising principle:4
ORDINAL HEDGING: An option is choiceworthy if, and only if, it is not
indeterminacy-dominated.
ORDINAL HEDGING has many virtues. For a start, if there are determinately
permissible options available then this principle will label all and only these options
as choiceworthy (for broadly the same reason that MODEST did so: no option can
indeterminacy dominate a determinately permissible option and determinately
permissible options will indeterminacy dominate indeterminately permissible
options). Further, this principle will label O5 as choiceworthy. After all, neither
O4 nor O6 indeterminacy dominate this option because O5 is better than O4 on the
second sharpening and is better than O6 on the first sharpening. So O5 is not
indeterminacy dominated and so is choiceworthy according to ORDINAL HEDGING.
Insofar as we want to make room for such hedging, this is a feature of ORDINAL
HEDGING
However, this principle also faces a challenge.5 Consider Bertha, who is entirely
self-interested and who will enter the cabinet mentioned earlier in one week’s time,
such that After-Bertha will emerge and it’s indeterminate whether After-Bertha will
be Bertha. Bertha now has three options: (1) choosing After will lead After-Bertha
to receive $1000 in a week’s time; (2) choosing Before will lead Bertha to receive
$100 immediately; and (3) choosing Both will lead both Bertha and After-Bertha to
receive $50.01.
Now consider our two sharpenings. On the sharpening where After-Bertha is
Bertha, the options will be ranked as follows: After  Both  Before. After all, on
this sharpening, After gives Bertha $1000, Both gives her $100.02, and Before gives
her $100. On the other hand, on the sharpening where After-Bertha is not Bertha,
the options will be ranked as follows: Before  Both  After. After all, on this
sharpening Before gives Bertha $100, Both gives her $50.01, and After gives her $0.
With this case in mind, turn back to ORDINAL HEDGING. This principle will label
choosing Both as choiceworthy, as it isn’t indeterminacy dominated by any
alternative option (because it is better than Before on the sharpening on which
After-Bertha is Bertha and is better than After on the sharpening on which After-
Bertha is not Bertha). However, such hedging is problematic.6 After all, compared
to choosing Before, choosing Both is only a minuscule amount better on one
sharpening ($0.02 better) but it is substantially worse on the other ($49.49 worse).
The potential benefit gained from hedging here is not worth the potential cost.
4 This principle is named for the fact that it allows for hedging but that this hedging depends only on how
the various options are ranked on various sharpenings and doesn’t account for the extent to which the
options differ in value on different sharpenings. I return to this issue shortly.
5 I owe this case to an anonymous reviewer for Analysis.
6 Perhaps someone could choose to hold firm here and argue that this hedging is acceptable. For such a
person, ORDINAL HEDGING will be a promising principle.
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Consequently, one should not hedge by choosing Both and so ORDINAL HEDGING is
problematic insofar as it labels this option as choiceworthy.
In the light of this, a natural response is to take a leaf from the literature on
decision making given uncertainty and move to a value sum. In particular, let VSðOÞ
be a function that assigns numerical values to the agent’s options such that these
values represent how desirable this option is on a sharpening, S.7 We can then define
an option value, for an option O, as follows:
OVðOÞ ¼
X
S2S
VSðOÞ
In words: we determine an option’s OV by summing the value of this option
according to each sharpening.8 With this formula in mind, we can now present the
following principle of choiceworthiness:
CARDINAL HEDGING: An option is choiceworthy if, and only if, it maximises OV
(that is, if and only if it has an OV greater than or equal to that assigned to each
other option).
CARDINAL HEDGING has a range of virtues. For a start, it will never label an
indeterminacy-dominated option as choiceworthy. After all, if I is indeterminacy
dominated by D then for all S, VSðDÞVSðIÞ and for some S, VSðDÞ[VSðIÞ. It
follows from this that OVðDÞ[OVðIÞ and so follows that I is not choiceworthy.
CARDINAL HEDGING also delivers the desired result in the Bertha case, above. If we
let the option values equal the monetary values that result from choosing each
option then we end up with the following values for the available options (where ¼
refers to the state where After-Bertha is Bertha, and 6¼ refers to the state where this
is not the case):
7 Those wishing to accept the principle to be outlined will need to tell us more about this value function.
For example, such a person should tell us how this value function is calculated based on a value function
that applies to outcomes (if it is calculated in such a manner), should tell us how this value function is
revealed in choice, and should tell us what the connection is between the values assigned by this function
and the utilities that play a role in standard decision theory.
8 As currently characterised, the OV sum gives equal weighting to the values assigned by each
sharpening (rather than treating some sharpenings as more important than others). Such an approach
might be motivated by an appeal to neutrality—that is, to the assumption that no sharpening should be
privileged over others when considering choice under indeterminacy. Still, this assumption might be
questioned. To see this, consider two versions of the case from Sect. 3. In both versions of the case, we
may stipulate, it is indeterminate whether After-Alice is Alice. However, in the first After-Alice is
extremely similar to Alice while in the second After-Alice is less similar to Alice. There’s at least some
intuitive force to the claim that the sharpening on which After-Alice is Alice should be weighted more
heavily in the first case than in the second (I owe this example to a reviewer for the journal). The OV sum
as stated is unable to accommodate this possibility.
Fortunately, the approach to be discussed here has no deep commitment to the assumption of neutrality.
After all, letting W be a weighting function that assigns weightings to sharpenings, the OV sum could be
replaced with the following sum: OV 0ðOÞ ¼PS2S WðSÞVSðOÞ. Insofar as W can assign different
weightings to different sharpenings, the OV 0 sum need not treat all sharpenings in the same manner. So
those who think that some sharpenings should be weighted more heavily than others can still accept the
broad account to be offered here, after replacing the appeal to OV with an appeal to OV 0. I thank a
reviewer for the journal for raising this issue.
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OVðBeforeÞ ¼ V¼ðBeforeÞ þ V 6¼ðBeforeÞ
¼ 100 þ 100
¼ 200
OVðBothÞ ¼ V¼ðBothÞ þ V6¼ðBothÞ
¼ 100:02 þ 50:01
¼ 150:03
OVðAfterÞ ¼ V¼ðAfterÞ þ V6¼ðAfterÞ
¼ 1000 þ 0
¼ 1000
Now Both does not maximise OV and so CARDINAL HEDGING will not label this
option as choiceworthy. So CARDINAL HEDGING provides a more compelling way of
spelling out the view on which we should allow for hedging in cases of
indeterminacy.
I conclude that we should reject LIBERAL and CONSERVATIVE and then, depending
on our views of the puzzle case above, we have strong grounds to accept either
MODEST or CARDINAL HEDGING in their place.
7 Conservative again
To this point, I have argued that LIBERAL and CONSERVATIVE are both inadequate
principles of choiceworthiness. However, there’s a sense in which the view that I
have outlined in this paper is more sympathetic to the former principle than it is to
the latter. In particular, this view sides with LIBERAL in taking it that there are facts of
the matter about choiceworthiness for options that are indeterminately permissible:
LIBERAL and the views that I have outlined differ merely in terms of what these facts
are taken to be. On the other hand, CONSERVATIVE takes a totally distinct approach, by
denying that there are further facts to be found at all. This raises a question: what
could the proponent of CONSERVATIVE say in response to the discussion to this point,
to try to hold on to her stance?
Here’s one possibility: the proponent of CONSERVATIVE could continue to hold that
there are no facts of the matter about the choiceworthiness of an indeterminately
permissible option but could acknowledge that certain indeterminately permissible
options will be more psychologically compelling to us than others. On this view, the
discussion in this paper largely sidestepped normative matters entirely. Instead, this
discussion served to provide insight into the descriptive issue of what characteristics
an indeterminately permissible option needs to have in order to seem more or less
reasonable to us. So, for example, even though there are no facts of the matter about
their choiceworthiness, on this view this paper has revealed that we will find an
indeterminately permissible option more compelling if it is not indeterminacy
dominated than we will if it is indeterminacy dominated.
I leave it to the reader to judge whether this is a reasonable response to the
preceding discussion. Nevertheless, this suggestion at least makes room for
CONSERVATIVE to survive the above objections.
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8 Conclusions
Setting aside the brief discussion of CONSERVATIVE, the core conclusion of this paper
is that we should accept a necessary criterion for an indeterminately permissible
option to be choiceworthy: for such an option to be choiceworthy, it must not be
indeterminacy dominated. I then argued for a secondary claim, which I accept more
tenuously. In particular, according to this claim, we should accept either MODEST or
CARDINAL HEDGING as a principle of choiceworthiness under conditions of
indeterminacy.
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